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Abstract
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a
necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal
stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a
local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources – we refer to this
condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity.
A related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that
the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property
is unit acyclicity.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism
to satisfy converse consistency principles. First, we identify a necessary and sufficient con-
dition (local shift-freeness) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable
mechanism satisfies local converse consistency. Interestingly, local acyclicity implies local
shift-freeness and hence the student-optimal stable mechanism more frequently satisfies local
converse consistency than local consistency. Second, in order for the student-optimal stable
mechanism to be globally conversely consistent, one again has to impose unit acyclicity on
the priority structure. Hence, unit acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition on the
priority structure for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy global consistency or
global converse consistency.
JEL classification: D63, C78.
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1 Introduction
A student placement problem is determined by a set of students, a set of position types, the
number of available positions – the quota – of each type, and the students’ strict preferences over
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position types (e.g., a position type could represent the admission to a college or university) and
remaining unassigned. A student placement mechanism assigns to any given student placement
problem an allocation of the position types to the students such that every student receives at
most one position and quotas are binding. In contrast to so-called house allocation problems,
where an assignment is made on the basis of students’ preferences over position types alone,1 we
assume that in a student placement problem additional information is available.2 For instance,
college admissions of undergraduate students are often based on rankings obtained from one or
several entrance exams. Then, students who achieved higher test scores in the entrance exam
of a certain college have higher priority for admission at that college than students with lower
test scores. We will model this situation using strict priority rankings of individuals for each
position type (possibly using tie-breaking). We call the collection of strict priority rankings a
priority structure.
A placement mechanism violates the priority of student i for position x if there exist prefer-
ences under which student i envies student j who obtains x even though i has a higher priority
for x than j. A placement mechanism is fair if it never violates the priority of any student.
Ergin (2002) focuses on the so-called student-optimal stable mechanism (introduced by Gale
and Shapley, 1962) since it is fair and Pareto superior to any other fair placement mechanism.
Ergin (2002, Theorem 1) provides a necessary and sufficient “acyclicity” condition on the prior-
ity structure for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy several appealing properties.
In particular, he considers a notion of consistency. Loosely speaking, a placement mechanism
is consistent if, whenever some students leave with their allotments, the placement mechanism
allocates the remaining positions among the students who did not leave in the same way as in the
original placement problem. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on
a fixed population of agents and fixed resources – we refer to this condition as local consistency
and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. Interestingly, a closely related
local consistency property is used by Kojima and U¨nver (2011) to characterize the so-called
“Boston” mechanism, which is a direct competitor of the student-optimal stable mechanism in
the context of school choice.
The local consistency notions, however, are different from the standard consistency notion
since the set of students and the quotas are fixed. A related but stronger necessary and sufficient
condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a
more standard global consistency property is unit acyclicity (Corollary 1).3
The main part of this paper focuses on a property that is closely related to consistency,
namely converse consistency. Converse consistency refers to an inverse of the reduction operation
that consistency uses. Thomson (2009, page 30) describes converse consistency as a property
of “decentralizability:” given some problem, if an allocation is chosen for each of its associated
reduced two-agent problems, then it should be chosen for the problem involving the whole
group. Converse consistency has practical appeal whenever small problems are much easier to
1Sometimes it is also assumed that exactly one position of each type is available. Some recent articles on house
allocation problems are Ergin (2000), Ehlers (2002), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2003, 2006, 2007),
and Velez (2012).
2See, for instance, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Ergin (2002), and Kesten (2006).
3For instance, Thomson’s (2009, page 16) “Fundamental Definition” of consistency deals with a variable
population setup and imposes the consistency requirement on all subpopulations as well.
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solve than large ones. For two-sided matching problems, the two-agent subgroup assumption
that converse consistency is based on is usually adjusted to include somewhat larger groups
of agents (Thomson, 2009, page 209). Two papers exploring aspects of converse consistency
for marriage problems (one-to-one matching problems) are Sasaki and Toda (1992) and O¨zkal-
Sanver (2013). Sasaki and Toda (1992) show that the core correspondence for marriage markets
satisfies converse consistency and that this property is part of a core characterization; we briefly
discuss O¨zkal-Sanver (2013) below. For an overview of the literature on converse consistency
and its computational implications in other contexts we refer to Thomson (2009, 2011, 2012).
O¨zkal-Sanver (2013, Example 2.1) shows that, depending on the priority structure, the
student-optimal stable mechanism may not satisfy converse consistency. In view of this negative
result, there are (at least) two ways to proceed. The first approach is to expand the student-
optimal stable mechanism to obtain a conversely consistent (multi-valued) correspondence. A
particularly interesting correspondence is the minimal expansion that is conversely consistent.
O¨zkal-Sanver (2013) takes this approach and her main result is the identification of the minimal
conversely consistent extension of the student-optimal stable mechanism (O¨zkal-Sanver, 2013,
Theorem 3.1). In view of the practical and theoretical relevance of the student-optimal stable
matching mechanism, a second approach would consist of the identification of conditions un-
der which it is conversely consistent. Our paper takes this approach. Moreover, in contrast to
O¨zkal-Sanver (2013) (and Sasaki and Toda, 1992), we consider a many-to-one model.
Similarly to the previous discussion on consistency, one can consider local converse consis-
tency based on a fixed set of students and a fixed quota vector, or allow for the general variable
population and resource context and consider (standard) global converse consistency. We first
identify a necessary and sufficient condition (local shift-freeness) on the priority structure such
that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies local converse consistency (Theorem 2). In-
terestingly, local acyclicity implies local shift-freeness (Lemma 2) and hence the student-optimal
stable mechanism more frequently satisfies local converse consistency than local consistency
(Corollary 2). Furthermore, in situations where at most one position per position type is avail-
able, both conditions coincide (Lemma 3) and the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies
local converse consistency if and only if it satisfies local consistency (Corollary 3).
Finally, in order for the student-optimal stable mechanism to be globally conversely consis-
tent, one again has to impose unit acyclicity on the priority structure (Corollary 4). Hence, the
student-optimal stable mechanism is globally conversely consistent if and only if it is globally
consistent (Corollary 5). This result is interesting in view of a result by Velez (2012). In the con-
text of house allocation problems, he shows that there is no logical relation between consistency
and converse consistency.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the student placement model
and the student-optimal stable mechanism. Section 3 (4) contains the local and global (converse)
consistency results mentioned above.
3
2 Student Placement
Let N¯ = {1, . . . , n} denote a set of students with n ≥ 3. Let X = {x1, . . . , xp} denote a set of
(real) position types with |X| ≥ 3.4 For each position type x ∈ X, at most q¯x ∈ N copies are
available with 1 ≤ q¯x ≤ |N¯ |. Furthermore, while q¯x denotes the maximal number of positions of
type x that might become available, by qx ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q¯x} we denote the number of positions, the
quota, of position type x that are available. A quota vector q ≡ (qx)x∈X denotes the quota of all
position types. Note that we use the term “position x” when we refer to one of the qx positions
of position type x. Let 0 denote the null position, which does not belong to X; “receiving the
null position” means “not receiving any position.” Since the null position is freely available, we
simply assume q0 =∞.
Each student i ∈ N¯ is equipped with a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation
Ri over X ∪ {0}, i.e., Ri is a linear order over X ∪ {0}. Given x, y ∈ X ∪ {0}, x Pi y means that
student i strictly prefers x to y. If xPi 0, then position x is acceptable for student i, otherwise it
is unacceptable (and 0 Pi x). Let R denote the set of strict, transitive, and complete preference
relations over X ∪ {0}. For each N ⊆ N¯ , RN is the set of (preference) profiles R = (Ri)i∈N
such that for all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R. Given N ′ ⊆ N ⊆ N¯ and R ∈ RN , let RN ′ denote the profile
(Ri)i∈N ′ ; it is the restriction of profile R to the set of students N ′.
Let x ∈ X. We call a linear order x over N¯ a priority ordering for position type x. Given
i, j ∈ N¯ , i 6= j, student i has a higher priority for position x than student j if i x j. A priority
structure is a profile  = (x)x∈X specifying for each position type a priority ordering.
A (student) placement problem (N,R, q) consists of a (finite) set of students N ⊆ N¯ , prefer-
ences R ∈ RN , and a quota vector q = (qx)x∈X such that for all positions x ∈ X, 0 ≤ qx ≤ q¯x.
We assume that the null position is available in any placement problem. Finally, we assume that
a priority structure  is externally given (we do not include it in the description of a placement
problem because we assume it to be fixed).
For each placement problem (N,R, q), each student i ∈ N is to be allocated exactly one
position in X ∪{0} taking quotas as upper bounds. Formally, an allocation for (N,R, q) is a list
α = (αi)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , αi ∈ X ∪ {0}, and for all x ∈ X, |{i ∈ N : αi = x}| ≤ qx.
Thus, by definition an allocation respects the quotas. Note that not all available positions need
to be assigned. Given i ∈ N , we call αi the allotment of student i at α.
Next, we introduce the notion of a reduced student placement problem and of a reduced
allocation. Consider a student placement problem (N,R, q), an allocation α for it, and a subset
N ′ ⊆ N of students. Then, the reduced placement problem (N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) for students N ′
at allocation α is defined as the placement problem where the set of students equals N ′ and the
only position types that are available to them are those not allocated to students in N \N ′ at
α, i.e., for all x ∈ X, q(N ′, α)x = qx − |{i ∈ N \ N ′ : αi = x}|. Let αN ′ denote the allocation
(αi)i∈N ′ . It is the restriction of allocation α to the set of students N ′. Note that αN ′ is an
allocation for (N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)).
4The cases |N¯ | ≤ 2 or |X| ≤ 2 are trivial because then the central properties of the article (consistency and
converse consistency) have no bite. Furthermore, our results remain unchanged for infinite N¯ or X.
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An allocation α is individually rational for placement problem (N,R, q) if for each i ∈ N ,
allotment αi is acceptable for student i.
An allocation α is non-wasteful for placement problem (N,R, q) if there are no student i ∈ N
and position x ∈ X such that x Pi αi and |{j ∈ N : αj = x}| < qx.
An allocation α violates the priority of student i ∈ N for placement problem (N,R, q) if
there exists a position x such that student i has a higher priority for x than one of the students
assigned to it and student i prefers to switch to position x, i.e., there exist x ∈ X and j ∈ N \{i}
such that i x j, αj = x, and x Pi αi.
A (student) placement mechanism is a function ϕ that assigns to each placement problem
(N,R, q) an allocation ϕ(N,R, q).
A placement mechanism ϕ is individually rational if for each placement problem (N,R, q),
ϕ(N,R, q) is individually rational for placement problem (N,R, q).
A placement mechanism ϕ is non-wasteful if for each placement problem (N,R, q), ϕ(N,R, q)
is non-wasteful for placement problem (N,R, q).
A placement mechanism ϕ is fair (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) if for each placement problem
(N,R, q), ϕ(N,R, q) does not violate the priority of any student for placement problem (N,R, q).
Given a placement problem (N,R, q), we can associate (N,R, q) with a college admissions
problem as follows (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999): the set of students equals N , the set of position
types X ∪ {0} corresponds to the set of colleges, the quota vector q describes colleges’ quotas,
preferences R correspond to students’ preferences over colleges, and the priority structure  is
taken to represent colleges’ responsive preferences over students with the additional specification
that the priority ordering 0 of the “null college” can be arbitrary. Furthermore (Balinski
and So¨nmez, 1999, Lemma 2), an allocation α is individually rational, non-wasteful, and fair
for placement problem (N,R, q) if and only if the associated “matching” α is stable for the
associated college admissions problem, i.e., α is individually rational for (N,R, q) and there
exists no student-position blocking pair (i, x) ∈ N × (X ∪ {0}) such that x Pi αi and (s1) |{j ∈
N : αj = x}| < qx or (s2) there exists k ∈ N such that αk = x and i x k.5
For each placement problem (N,R, q), we denote by ϕ(N,R, q) the student-optimal stable
allocation for placement problem (N,R, q) that is obtained by using Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm:
• At the first step of the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, every student in
N applies to her/his favorite position. For each position x ∈ X ∪ {0}, the qx applicants
who have the highest priority for x (all applicants if there are fewer than qx or x = 0) are
placed on the waiting list of position x, and all others are rejected. (If qx = 0, then all
proposing students are rejected.)
• At the r-th step of the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, those applicants
who were rejected at step r − 1 apply to their next best position. For each position
5The definition of stability here is less general than the one for college admissions problems because for student
placement problems, position types always “find all students acceptable.” For more details on the well-known
college admissions model and basic and well-known results for this model, we refer the interested reader to Gale
and Shapley (1962) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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x ∈ X ∪ {0}, the qx applicants among the new applicants and those on the waiting list
who have the highest priority for position x are placed on the updated waiting list of
position x, and all others are rejected.
The student-optimal deferred-acceptance algorithm terminates when every student is on a wait-
ing list. Note that the null position has unlimited capacity and eventually any student is put on
the waiting list of a real position x ∈ X or the null position. Once the algorithm ends, positions
are assigned to the students on the respective position waiting lists and the resulting allocation
is the student-optimal stable allocation ϕ(N,R, q) for the placement problem (N,R, q).
By ϕ we denote the student-optimal stable mechanism that assigns to each placement
problem (N,R, q) the student-optimal stable allocation ϕ(N,R, q).
3 Consistency
3.1 Local Consistency
Ergin (2002) refers to the student-optimal stable mechanism ϕ as the “best rule” and analyzes
for which priority structures , ϕ satisfies well-known and desirable properties given a fixed set
of students N ⊆ N¯ and a fixed quota vector q. Ergin (2002, Theorem 1) provides a necessary and
sufficient acyclicity condition (Definition 2 below) for the student-optimal stable mechanism to
satisfy either of Pareto efficiency,6 group strategy-proofness,7 and a (local!) consistency property
(Ergin, 2002, p. 2494) that we explain next.
Loosely speaking, a placement mechanism is consistent if, whenever some students leave
with their allotments, the placement mechanism allocates the remaining positions among the
students who did not leave in the same way as in the original placement problem. In order to
introduce consistency of a placement mechanism in a model where the set of agents and resources
are fixed a priori, Ergin (2002) only requires a local consistency check for all reduced placement
problems that are obtained from an original placement problem (N,R, q) (N and q being fixed).8
Formally, Ergin (2002, p. 2493) only requires that ϕ is consistent on the domain of reduced
placement problems that are obtained from a placement problem (N,R, q) when a subset of
agents N ′ ⊆ N reallocates resources after agents in N \ N ′ have left with their allotments at
ϕ(N,R, q).
Definition 1. Local consistency
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. A placement mechanism ϕ is locally
consistent for (N, q) if for each profile R ∈ RN and each subset of students N ′ ⊆ N : [for all
i ∈ N ′, ϕi(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, ϕ(N,R, q))) = ϕi(N,R, q)]. 4
The reason why Ergin’s consistency property takes a “local form” is that the other properties
in Ergin’s (2002) Theorem 1, Pareto efficiency and group strategy-proof, are local properties as
6A placement mechanism is Pareto efficient if no assigned allocation can be (Pareto) improved such that all
students are weakly better off and some are strictly better off.
7A placement mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of students, by jointly misrepresenting their
preferences, can change their allotments such that all members of the group are weakly better off and some are
strictly better off.
8Thomson and Zhou (1993) take a similar “local consistency” approach in a model with atomless economies.
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well, i.e., they are defined for fixed N and q. However, for real life placement problems it also
might just be more practical and normatively sufficient to require consistency only within each
application round (which means that the set of agents and the quota are indeed fixed) and not
across all previous, future, and potentially possible application rounds.
Next, we introduce Ergin’s (2002, p. 2492) acyclicity condition for priority structures. Again,
since the set of agents N and the quota vector q are fixed, acyclicity has a “local character.”
Definition 2 (Ergin, 2002). Local cycles and local acyclicity
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. Given a priority structure , a local cycle
for (N, q) is constituted of ordered and distinct x, y ∈ X (qx, qy 6= 0) and i, j, k ∈ N such that
the following two conditions are satisfied:
cycle condition i x j x k y i and
c-scarcity condition there exist disjoint (and possibly empty) sets Nx, Ny ⊆ N \ {i, j, k} such
that Nx ⊆ {l ∈ N : l x j}, Ny ⊆ {l ∈ N : l y i}, |Nx| = qx − 1, and |Ny| = qy − 1.
A priority structure  is locally acyclic for (N, q) if it has no local cycles for (N, q). 4
If quotas are all equal to 1, then the cycle condition is sufficient to establish the existence
of a local cycle. For other quotas, the c-scarcity condition limits the definition of a local cycle
to cases where there indeed exist students’ preferences such that students i, j, and k compete
for position types x and y (in the absence of this competition, e.g., because the quotas do in
fact not limit the access of the students to positions x and y, a local cycle will not lead to the
violation of Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, or local consistency – see Ergin, 2002,
for further discussion).
Ergin (2002, Theorem 1, (iii)⇔(iv), p. 2494) characterizes local consistency of the student-
optimal stable mechanism by local acyclicity (Ergin, 2002, uses the terms consistency and acyclic-
ity without referring to their local character).
Theorem 1 (Ergin, 2002). Local consistency of the student-optimal stable mechanism
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of agents, q a quota vector, and  a priority structure. Then, ϕ is locally
consistent for (N, q) if and only if  is locally acyclic for (N, q).
3.2 Global Consistency
In the literature, consistency is usually defined for models with a variable population and vari-
able resources.9 In order to distinguish this standard notion of consistency from Ergin’s local
consistency property, we will refer to it as global consistency.
In our variable population and variable resources extension of Ergin’s (2002) model, a mech-
anism ϕ is globally consistent if for any set of present agents N and for any set of available
resources (represented by a quota vector q), it is locally consistent.
Definition 3. Global consistency
A placement mechanism ϕ is globally consistent if it is locally consistent for all (N, q) such that
N ⊆ N¯ and q is a quota vector. 4
9See Ergin (2000) and Thomson (2009, 2011) for the indivisible-object assignment setting and general allocation
problems, respectively.
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Using Ergin’s (2002) result (Theorem 1), we now identify a necessary and sufficient condition
for priority structure  to guarantee that ϕ is globally consistent.
Definition 4. Unit cycles and unit acyclicity
Given a priority structure , a unit cycle is constituted of ordered and distinct x, y ∈ X and
i, j, k ∈ N¯ such that the following condition is satisfied:
cycle condition i x j x k y i.
A priority structure  is unit acyclic if it has no unit cycles. 4
Corollary 1. Global consistency of the student-optimal stable mechanism
Let  be a priority structure. Then, ϕ is globally consistent if and only if  is unit acyclic.
Proof. Let  be a priority structure. By definition, ϕ is globally consistent if for all N ⊆ N¯ and
all quota vectors q, ϕ is locally consistent for (N, q). By Theorem 1 (Ergin, 2002, Theorem 1,
(iii)⇔(iv)), this is equivalent to the priority structure  being locally acyclic for all N ⊆ N¯ and
for all quota vectors q. We complete the proof by showing that  being locally acyclic for all
N ⊆ N¯ and for all q is equivalent to  being unit acyclic.
If  is unit acyclic, then the cycle condition in Definition 2 cannot be satisfied for any three
distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N¯ . Hence,  is locally acyclic for all N ⊆ N¯ and for all q.
Now assume that  is not unit acyclic. Hence, there exist distinct x, y ∈ X and i, j, k ∈ N¯
such that i x j x k y i. Let N = {i, j, k} and q such that qx = 1, qy = 1, and for all
z ∈ X \ {x, y}, qz = 0. Then, we have constructed a local cycle for (N, q).
4 Converse Consistency
We are also interested in a property that is closely related to consistency: converse consistency.
Converse consistency refers to an inverse of the reduction operation that consistency uses.
Given some problem, it requires that if a mechanism or correspondence (partially) chooses
an allocation for each of its associated reduced two-agent problems, then the (whole) allocation
should be chosen for the problem involving the whole group. Sasaki and Toda (1992) and O¨zkal-
Sanver (2013) consider converse consistency for the closely related class of marriage problems
(one-to-one matching problems). Furthermore, Thomson (2009, 2011) provides an extensive
survey of consistency and its converse for various economic models. Since we focus on the
student-optimal stable mechanism, we introduce converse consistency directly for mechanisms
and not (as is the standard) for correspondences.
4.1 Local Converse Consistency
Similarly as in Section 3, we first introduce a “local version” of converse consistency. For real
life placement problems that would mean that converse consistency is only required within an
application round but not across different application rounds.
Definition 5. Local converse consistency
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. A placement mechanism ϕ is locally
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conversely consistent for (N, q) if for each profile R ∈ RN and for each allocation α for place-
ment problem (N,R, q): [if for all N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2, ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ , then
ϕ(N,R, q) = α]. 4
The following example demonstrates that a student-optimal stable mechanism might violate
local converse consistency (our example is a simplification of O¨zkal-Sanver’s, 2013, Example 2.1).
Example 1. A priority structure  such that ϕ is not locally conversely consistent
Let X = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and qx = qy = qz = 1. Consider the priority structure  and
preferences R ∈ RN as given in the tables below.
x y z
1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
and
R1 R2 R3
z x y
x y z
For this placement problem, ϕ(N,R, q) = (z, x, y). Let α = (x, y, z). One easily verifies
that for all N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2, ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ . However, ϕ(N,R, q) 6= α.
Therefore, ϕ is not locally conversely consistent for (N, q). (Incidentally, notice that α is
the position-type-optimal stable matching of the associated marriage problem.) Observe that
1 x 2 y 3 z 1, which turns out to be the “problematic part” in priority structure  that
causes ϕ to violate local converse consistency. 
Given a fixed set of students N and a fixed quota vector q, we first analyze which priority
structures  guarantee that the student-optimal stable mechanism ϕ is locally conversely
consistent for (N, q). In line with Ergin’s (2002) result, we show that local acyclicity of the
priority structure for (N, q) is sufficient for ϕ to be locally conversely consistent for (N, q).
However, it turns out that the class of priority structures that induce ϕ to be locally conversely
consistent for (N, q) is strictly larger than the class of locally acyclic priority structures for (N, q).
We first introduce local shift-freeness of a priority structure  for (N, q). We then prove
that local shift-freeness for (N, q) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the student-optimal
stable mechanism ϕ to be locally conversely consistent for (N, q) (Theorem 2).
Definition 6. Local shifts and local shift-freeness
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. Given a priority structure , a local shift
for (N, q) is constituted of ordered and distinct x, y, z ∈ X (qx, qy, qz 6= 0) and i, j, k ∈ N such
that the following two conditions are satisfied:
shift condition i x j y k z i and
s-scarcity condition there exist disjoint (and possibly empty) sets Nx, Ny, Nz ⊆ N \ {i, j, k}
such that Nx ⊆ {l ∈ N : l x j}, Ny ⊆ {l ∈ N : l y k}, Nz ⊆ {l ∈ N : l z i}, |Nx| = qx − 1,
|Ny| = qy − 1, and |Nz| = qz − 1.
A priority structure  is locally shift-free for (N, q) if it has no local shifts for (N, q). 4
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If quotas are all equal to 1, then the shift condition is sufficient to establish the existence
of a local shift. For other quotas, the s-scarcity condition limits the definition of a local shift
to cases where there indeed exist students’ preferences such that students i, j, and k compete
for position types x, y, and z (in the absence of this competition, e.g., because the quotas do in
fact not limit the access of the students to positions x, y, and z, a local shift will not cause the
student-optimal stable mechanism ϕ to violate local converse consistency).
Note that Example 1 exhibits a local “3-shift” in the sense that it involves 3 students (and
3 position types). We will use the following concept of more general local shifts to prove our
main result.
Definition 7. Local k-shifts
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. Given a priority structure , a local
k-shift for (N, q) is constituted of ordered and distinct x1, . . . , xk ∈ X (qx1 , . . . , qxk 6= 0) and
i1, . . . , ik ∈ N with k ≥ 3 such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
k-shift condition i1 x1 i2 x2 i3 x3 · · · xk−1 ik xk ik+1 := i1 and
s-scarcity condition there exist disjoint (and possibly empty) sets Nxl ⊆ N \ {i1, . . . , ik} (l =
1, . . . , k) such that Nxl ⊆ {j ∈ N : j xl il+1} and |Nxl | = qxl − 1 (l = 1, . . . , k). 4
We next show that for any pair (N, q), the presence of a local k-shift for (N, q) implies the
presence of a local shift for (N, q).
Lemma 1. Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. If a priority structure  has
a local k-shift for (N, q), then it has a local shift for (N, q).
Proof. Assume that priority structure  has a local k-shift for (N, q) with k > 3. We prove that
then it also has a local shift for (N, q) (i.e., a local 3-shift for (N, q)).
Case I:  has a local 4-shift for (N, q).
Assume that x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ X (qx1 , . . . , qx4 6= 0) and (without loss of generality) 1, 2, 3, 4 ∈ N
constitute a local 4-shift for (N, q) (with the required Nx1 , Nx2 , Nx3 , Nx4) such that (part of)
the priority structure restricted to {x1, x2, x3, x4} and {1, 2, 3, 4} exhibits the structure given by
the next table.
x1 x2 x3 x4
1 2 3 4
2 3 4 1
Assume 2 x1 3. Then, x1, x3, x4 and 1, 3, 4 constitute a local shift for (N, q) (with Nx1 , Nx3 ,
and Nx4 from the original local 4-shift for (N, q)). Similarly, 3 x2 4, 4 x3 1, and 1 x4 2 lead
to local shifts for (N, q). Thus, assume that 3 x1 2, 4 x2 3, 1 x3 4, and 2 x4 1. Then, (part
of) the priority structure restricted to {x1, x2, x3, x4} and {1, 2, 3, 4} exhibits the structure given
by the next table where the notation [i, j] for position type x means that either i x j or j x i.
x1 x2 x3 x4
[1,3] [2,4] [1,3] [2,4]
2 3 4 1
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Assume 4 x1 2. Then x4, x3, x1 and 2, 1, 4 constitute a local shift for (N, q) (with Nx4 , Nx3 ,
and Nx1 from the original local 4-shift for (N, q)). Similarly, 1 x2 3, 2 x3 4, and 3 x4 1 lead
to local shifts for (N, q). Thus, assume that 2 x1 4, 3 x2 1, 4 x3 2, and 1 x4 3. Then, (part
of) the priority structure restricted to {x1, x2, x3, x4} and {1, 2, 3, 4} exhibits the structure given
by the next table.
x1 x2 x3 x4
[1,3] [2,4] [1,3] [2,4]
2 3 4 1
4 1 2 3
Then, x1, x2, x4 and 3, 4, 1 constitute a local shift for (N, q) (with Nx1 , Nx2 , and Nx4 from the
original local 4-shift for (N, q)).
Case II:  has a local k-shift for (N, q) with k ≥ 5.
Assume that x1, . . . , xk ∈ X (qx1 , . . . , qxk 6= 0) and (without loss of generality) 1, . . . , k ∈ N
constitute a local k-shift for (N, q) (with the required Nx1 , . . . , Nxk) such that (part of) the
priority structure restricted to {x1, . . . , xk} and {1, . . . , k} exhibits the structure given by the
next table.
x1 x2 x3 x4 · · · xk−1 xk
1 2 3 4 · · · k − 1 k
2 3 4 5 · · · k k + 1 := 1
Assume 1 xk 3. Then, x3, x4, . . . , xk and 3, 4, . . . , k − 1, k constitute a local (k − 2)-shift for
(N, q) (with Nx3 , Nx4 , . . . , Nxk from the original local k-shift for (N, q)). Note that k − 2 ≥ 3.
Similarly, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, l+ 1 xl l+ 3 leads to a local (k− 2)-shift for (N, q) (with the
convention to use the modulo k operator such that k + 2 = 2, k + 3 = 3, etc.). Thus, assume
for all l = 1, . . . , k that l + 3 xl l + 1. Then, (part of) the priority structure restricted to
{x1, . . . , xk} and {1, . . . , k} exhibits the structure given by the next table.
x1 x2 x3 x4 · · · xk−1 xk
[1,4] [2,5] [3,6] [4,7] · · · [k − 1, 2] [k, 3]
2 3 4 5 · · · k k + 1 := 1
Then, x2, x3, x4 and 5, 3, 4 constitute a local 3-shift for (N, q) (with Nx2 , Nx3 , and Nx4 from the
original local k-shift for (N, q)). To summarize Case II, if  has a local k-shift for (N, q) with
k ≥ 5 then it has also a local (k − 2)-shift for (N, q) or a local 3-shift for (N, q). In case of a
local (k − 2)-shift for (N, q), depending on (k − 2) = 4 or (k − 2) ≥ 5, we repeat the arguments
in Case I or II, and find a local 3-shift for (N, q) in finitely many steps.
We are now ready to state our main result for local converse consistency.
Theorem 2. Local converse consistency of the student-optimal stable mechanism
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of agents, q a quota vector, and  a priority structure. Then, ϕ is locally
conversely consistent for (N, q) if and only if  is locally shift-free for (N, q).
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Proof.
Part I: Assume that priority structure  has a local shift for (N, q). We show that then ϕ is
not locally conversely consistent for (N, q).
Assume that x, y, z ∈ X (qx, qy, qz 6= 0) and (without loss of generality) 1, 2, 3 ∈ N constitute
a local shift for (N, q) (with the required Nx, Ny, Nz) such that (part of) the priority structure
restricted to {x, y, z} and {1, 2, 3} exhibits the structure given by the next table.
x y z
1 2 3
2 3 1
Let N˜ = {1, 2, 3} ∪Nx ∪Ny ∪Nz and R ∈ RN be such that
R1 R2 R3 Ri (i ∈ Nx) Ri (i ∈ Ny) Ri (i ∈ Nz) Ri(i ∈ N \ N˜)
z x y x y z 0
x y z
and any position types that are not depicted in the preference table are unacceptable. For
placement problem (N,R, q), the student-optimal stable mechanism assigns to all students their
preferred position, i.e., ϕi (N,R, q) = x (i ∈ Nx ∪ {2}), ϕi (N,R, q) = y (i ∈ Ny ∪ {3}),
ϕi (N,R, q) = z (i ∈ Nz ∪ {1}), and ϕi (N,R, q) = 0 (i ∈ N \ N˜).
Now, consider allocation α for placement problem (N,R, q) that is obtained from ϕi (N,R, q)
by giving agents 1, 2, and 3 their second choice position and not changing the allotments of the
remaining agents, i.e., αi = x (i ∈ Nx ∪ {1}), αi = y (i ∈ Ny ∪ {2}), αi = z (i ∈ Nz ∪ {3}), and
αi = 0 (i ∈ N \ N˜).
Note that for placement problem (N,R, q), both allocations ϕ(N,R, q) and α allocate
all available positions of position types x, y, and z. Moreover, all other position types are
unacceptable for all students in N .
We prove that for all N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2, ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ . If N ′∩(N\N˜) 6= ∅,
then immediately ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ . Assume N ′ ∩ (N \ N˜) = ∅.
Case I: N ′∩{1, 2, 3} 6= ∅. Let N ′ = {i, j}. The table below summarizes the relevant information
to easily check that ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ (note that for all other choices of j, both agents
i and j receive their best available position).
i = j ∈ (αi, αj) both prefer decisive priority
1 Nz ∪ {3} (x, z) z j z i
2 Nx ∪ {1} (y, x) x j x i
3 Ny ∪ {2} (z, y) y j y i
Case II: N ′ ∩ {1, 2, 3} = ∅. Let N ′ = {i, j}. Since i, j ∈ Nx ∪Ny ∪Nz, students i and j obtain
the same (and their best) position at both allocations ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) and α. Hence,
ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ .
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If ϕ was locally conversely consistent for (N, q), then ϕ(N,R, q) = α, which is clearly not
the case.
Part II: Next, assume that ϕ is not locally conversely consistent for (N, q). We show that
then the priority structure  has a local shift for (N, q).
By Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show that the priority structure has a local k-shift for (N, q)
for some k ≥ 3.
Since ϕ is not locally conversely consistent for (N, q), there exist preferences R ∈ RN and
an allocation α for (N,R, q) such that ϕ(N,R, q) 6= α and for all N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2,
ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ .
Since for all N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2, ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ it follows from the definition
of ϕ that α is individually rational. Suppose allocation α violates the priority of a student
i ∈ N for placement problem (N,R, q). Then, there exists a position type x ∈ X and a student
j ∈ N \ {i} such that i x j, αj = x, and x Pi αi. Let N ′ = {i, j}. Then, the reduced allocation
αN ′ also violates the priority of i ∈ N for placement problem (N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)). However,
since ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ and ϕ is a fair mechanism, such a violation of priority is
impossible. Hence, allocation α does not violate the priority of any student in N for placement
problem (N,R, q). A similar argument shows that allocation α is non-wasteful for placement
problem (N,R, q).
Since for placement problem (N,R, q), α is individually rational, non-wasteful, and it does
not violate the priority of any student, allocation α corresponds to a stable matching in the
associated college admissions problem. Hence, it follows from Roth (1985, Theorem 2*) that for
all i ∈ N , ϕi (N,R, q)Riαi. From Roth (1984, Theorem 9) it follows that for all x ∈ X, |{i ∈ N :
ϕi (N,R, q) = x}| = |{i ∈ N : αi = x}|. Therefore, for each i ∈ N with ϕi (N,R, q) 6= αi (i.e.,
ϕi (N,R, q) Pi αi) there exists j ∈ N \ {i} with αj = ϕi (N,R, q) and ϕj (N,R, q) 6= αj . Since
ϕ(N,R, q) 6= α and |N | is finite, the previous observation establishes the existence of a group of
students (without loss of generality) {1, . . . , k} such that ϕ1 (N,R, q)P1α1 = ϕ2 (N,R, q)P2α2 =
. . . = ϕk (N,R, q) Pk αk = ϕ

1 (N,R, q).
Assume k = 2. Then, α2 P1 α1 P2 α2. By assumption that for all N
′ ⊆ N with |N ′| = 2,
ϕ(N ′, RN ′ , q(N ′, α)) = αN ′ , it follows that ϕ({1, 2}, R{1,2}, q({1, 2}, α)) = (α1, α2). Thus,
(α2, α1) strictly Pareto dominates ϕ
({1, 2}, R{1,2}, q({1, 2}, α)) in the college admissions market
associated with ({1, 2}, R{1,2}, q({1, 2}, α)); contradicting Roth (1982, Theorem 6).10 Hence,
k > 2.
From Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Theorem 5.27), by the polarization of interests between the
two sides of the associated college admissions market at the two stable (associated) matchings
ϕ(N,R, q) and α, we have 1 α1 2 α2 3 α3 · · · αk−1 k αk 1. So, (part of) the priority
structure restricted to {α1, . . . , αk} and {1, . . . , k} exhibits the structure given by the next table.
α1 α2 α3 α4 · · · αk−1 αk
1 2 3 4 · · · k − 1 k
2 3 4 5 · · · k k + 1 := 1
10Because economy ({1, 2}, R{1,2}, q({1, 2}, α)) might contain additional positions apart from α1 and α2, we
cannot immediately obtain a contradiction by directly calculating ϕ({1, 2}, R{1,2}, q({1, 2}, α)) = (α2, α1) (an
argument along these lines would involve non-wastefulness for the original economy (N,R, q)).
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Note that so far we have found distinct α1, . . . , αk ∈ X (qα1 , . . . , qαk 6= 0) and 1, . . . , k ∈ N with
k ≥ 3 that satisfy the k-shift condition in Definition 7. We now show that also the s-scarcity
condition is satisfied.
Let l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let i ∈ N such that αi = αl. Let N∗ = {i, l+ 1}. The only two positions
assigned at α to agents in N∗ for placement problem (N,R, q) are αl and αl+1. By our choice
of α (in violation of local converse consistency for (N, q)), αl and αl+1 then are the only two
positions assigned at ϕ(N∗, RN∗ , q(N∗, α)). Recall that αl Pl+1 αl+1. Therefore, if l+ 1 αl i,
then ϕl+1(N
∗, RN∗ , q(N∗, α)) = αl 6= αl+1; contradicting that αN∗ = ϕ(N∗, RN∗ , q(N∗, α)).
Hence, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for all i ∈ N with αi = αl, i αl l+1. Thus, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k},
Nαl := {i ∈ N : αi = αl} \ {l} satisfies Nαl ⊆ {i ∈ N : i αl l + 1}. Moreover, since for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, αlPl+1αl+1, it follows from non-wastefulness of α that |Nαl | = qαl−1. Finally, the
sets Nα1 , . . . , Nαk are mutually disjoint by definition. Hence, α1, . . . , αk and 1, . . . , k constitute
a local k-shift for (N, q) (with the required Nα1 , . . . , Nαk).
Next, we show that local acyclicity of a priority structure  for (N, q) implies that it is locally
shift-free for (N, q) as well (Lemma 2), and therefore, the local acyclicity of priority structure 
for (N, q) implies that the student-optimal stable mechanism ϕ is locally conversely consistent
for (N, q) (Corollary 2).
Lemma 2. Local acyclicity implies local shift-freeness
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. If a priority structure  is locally acyclic
for (N, q), then it is locally shift-free for (N, q). Moreover, local acyclicity for (N, q) is in general
not equivalent to local shift-freeness for (N, q).
Proof.
Part I: Assume that x, y, z ∈ X (qx, qy, qz 6= 0) and 1, 2, 3 ∈ N constitute a local shift for (N, q)
(with the required Nx, Ny, Nz). So, (part of) the priority structure restricted to {x, y, z} and
{1, 2, 3} exhibits the structure given by the next table.
x y z
1 2 3
2 3 1
If 2 x 3, then x, z and 1, 2, 3 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (with Nx and Ny from the
original shift for q). Similarly, 3 y 1 and 1 z 2 lead to local cycles for (N, q). Thus, assume
3 x 2, 1 y 3, and 2 z 1. Then, (part of) the priority structure restricted to {x, y, z} and
{1, 2, 3} exhibits the structure given by the next table where the notation [i, j] for position type
x means that either i x j or j x i.
x y z
[1,3] [1,2] [2,3]
2 3 1
Case I: 3 x 1. Then, 3 x 1 x 2. Assume qx > 1 and there is l ∈ Nx with 1 x l x 2.
Let N ′x = (Nx \ {l}) ∪ {3}. Then, x, z and 1, l, 2 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (with N ′x
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and Nz from the original local shift for (N, q)). Now assume qx = 1 or there is no l ∈ Nx with
1 x l x 2. Then, x, y and 3, 1, 2 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (with Nx and Nz from the
original local shift for (N, q)).
Case II: 1 x 3. Then, 1 x 3 x 2. Assume qx > 1 and there is l ∈ Nx with 3 x l x 2.
Let N ′x = (Nx \ {l}) ∪ {1}. Then, x, y and 3, l, 2 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (with N ′x
and Ny from the original local shift for (N, q)). Now assume qx = 1 or there is no l ∈ Nx with
3 x l x 2. Then, x, z and 1, 3, 2 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (with Nx and Nz from the
original local shift for (N, q)).
Part II: The following student placement problem shows that in general local acyclicity for
(N, q) is a strictly stronger condition than local shift-freeness for (N, q). Let N = {1, 2, 3} and
X = {x, y, z} with qx = qy = 1 and qz = 2. The priority structure  is given in the next table.
x y z
1 2 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
One easily verifies that x, y and 1, 2, 3 constitute a local cycle for (N, q), but that there is no
local shift for (N, q) (because the s-scarcity condition for z cannot be satisfied).
From Theorems 1, 2, and Lemma 2 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a quota vector. If a priority structure 
is locally acyclic for (N, q), then ϕ is locally conversely consistent for (N, q). Thus, if ϕ is
locally consistent for (N, q), then ϕ is also locally conversely consistent for (N, q).
For the special case when there is at most one position per position type, local acyclicity of
a priority structure  for (N, q) is equivalent to local shift-freeness of  for (N, q) (Lemma 3)
and local acyclicity of  for (N, q) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the student-optimal
stable mechanism ϕ to be locally conversely consistent for (N, q) (Corollary 3).
We call a quota vector q with qx ∈ {0, 1} (x ∈ X) a unit quota vector.
Lemma 3. Quotas equal to one: local shift-freeness implies local acyclicity
Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a unit quota vector. If a priority structure  is locally
shift-free for (N, q), then it is also locally acyclic for (N, q). Thus, a priority structure  is
locally shift-free for (N, q) if and only if it is locally acyclic for (N, q).
Proof. First note that for any unit quota vector q the c-scarcity condition and the s-scarcity
condition are vacuously satisfied. By Lemma 2, the presence of a local shift for (N, q) implies
the presence of a local cycle for (N, q).
Next, we prove that the presence of a local cycle for (N, q) implies the presence of a local
shift for (N, q). Suppose without loss of generality that x, y ∈ X (qx, qy 6= 0) and 1, 2, 3 ∈ N
constitute a local cycle for (N, q) such that 1 x 2 x 3 y 1. Since |X| ≥ 3, let z ∈ X \ {x, y}.
Case I: 3 y 2. If 2 z 1 z 3, 2 z 3 z 1, or 1 z 2 z 3, then z, y, x together with 2, 3, 1
constitute a local shift for (N, q). If 3 z 2 z 1, then x, y, z together with 1, 3, 2 constitute a
15
local shift for (N, q). Finally, if 1 z 3 z 2 or 3 z 1 z 2 then x, y, z together with 2, 3, 1
constitute a local shift for (N, q).
Case II: 2 y 3 y 1. If 3 z 1 z 2 or 3 z 2 z 1 then x, y, z together with 1, 2, 3 constitute
a local shift for (N, q). If 1 z 2 z 3 or 1 z 3 z 2, then x, y, z together with 2, 3, 1 constitute
a local shift for (N, q). Finally, if 2 z 1 z 3 or 2 z 3 z 1 then z, y, x together with 2, 3, 1
constitute a local shift for (N, q).
Corollary 3. Let N ⊆ N¯ be a set of students and q a unit quota vector. Then, a priority
structure  is locally acyclic for (N, q) if and only if ϕ is locally conversely consistent for
(N, q). Thus, ϕ is locally consistent for (N, q) if and only if ϕ is locally conversely consistent
for (N, q).
4.2 Global Converse Consistency
In the literature, also converse consistency is usually defined for models with a variable popula-
tion and variable resources.
Definition 8. Global converse consistency
A placement mechanism ϕ is globally conversely consistent if it is locally conversely consistent
for all (N, q) such that N ⊆ N¯ and q is a quota vector. 4
We are now ready to state our main result for global converse consistency, which parallels
Corollary 1 for global consistency.
Corollary 4. Global converse consistency of the student-optimal stable mechanism
Let  be a priority structure. Then, ϕ is globally conversely consistent if and only if  is unit
acyclic.
Proof.
Part I: Assume that priority structure  has a unit cycle. We prove that ϕ is not globally
conversely consistent. Let x, y ∈ X and (without loss of generality) 1, 2, 3 ∈ N¯ constitute a unit
cycle. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, qx = qy = qz = 1, and qx′ = 0 (x′ ∈ X \ {x, y, z}). One easily verifies
that x, y and 1, 2, 3 constitute a local cycle for (N, q) (notice that the c-scarcity condition is
vacuously satisfied). Hence, by Corollary 3, ϕ is not locally conversely consistent for (N, q).
So, ϕ is not globally conversely consistent.
Part II: Assume ϕ is not globally conversely consistent. Then, for some set of agents N ⊆ N¯
and quota vector q, ϕ is not locally conversely consistent for (N, q). By Theorem 2, the
priority structure  has a local shift for (N, q). Let x, y, z ∈ X (qx, qy, qz 6= 0) and (without loss
of generality) 1, 2, 3 ∈ N constitute a local shift for (N, q). Consider q˜ with q˜x = q˜y = q˜z = 1
and q˜x′ = 0 (x
′ ∈ X \ {x, y, z}). Then, q˜ is a unit quota vector and x, y, z ∈ X and 1, 2, 3 ∈ N
constitute a local shift for (N, q˜). By Lemma 2 (or Lemma 3), there is a local cycle for (N, q˜).
Hence, the priority structure  has a unit cycle.
Corollary 5. Let  be a priority structure. Then, ϕ is globally conversely consistent if and
only if ϕ is globally consistent.
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